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Infection Control Preparedness for Human Infection With Inﬂuenza
A H7N9 in Hong Kong
Vincent C. C. Cheng, MD, FRCPath;1,2 Josepha W. M. Tai, PhD;2 W. M. Lee, MsN;2 W. M. Chan, MBBS, FRCP;3
Sally C. Y. Wong, MBBChir, MRCP;1 Jonathan H. K. Chen, PhD;1 Rosana W. S. Poon, PhD;1
Kelvin K. W. To, MBBS, FRCPath;1 Jasper F. W. Chan, MBBS, FRCPath;1 P. L. Ho, MD, FRCPath;1
K. H. Chan, PhD;1 K. Y. Yuen, MD, FRCPath1
objective. To assess the effectiveness of infection control preparedness for human infection with inﬂuenza A H7N9 in Hong Kong.
design. A descriptive study of responses to the emergence of inﬂuenza A H7N9.
setting. A university-afﬁliated teaching hospital.
participants. Healthcare workers (HCWs) with unprotected exposure (not wearing N95 respirator during aerosol-generating procedure)
to a patient with inﬂuenza A H7N9.
methods. A bundle approach including active and enhanced surveillance, early airborne infection isolation, rapid molecular diagnostic
testing, and extensive contact tracing for HCWs with unprotected exposure was implemented. Seventy HCWs with unprotected exposure to an
index case were interviewed especially regarding their patient care activities.
results. From April 1, 2013, through May 31, 2014, a total of 126 (0.08%) of 163,456 admitted patients were tested for the H7 gene by
reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction per protocol. Two conﬁrmed cases were identiﬁed. Seventy (53.8%) of 130 HCWs
had unprotected exposure to an index case, whereas 41 (58.6%) and 58 (82.9%) of 70 HCWs wore surgical masks and practiced hand hygiene
after patient care, respectively. Sixteen (22.9%) of 70 HCWs were involved in high-risk patient contacts. More HCWs with high-risk patient
contacts received oseltamivir prophylaxis (P= 0.088) and signiﬁcantly more had paired sera collected for H7 antibody testing (P< 0.001). Ten
(14.3%) of 70 HCWs developed inﬂuenza-like illness during medical surveillance, but none had positive results by reverse transcription-
polymerase chain reaction. Paired sera was available from 33 of 70 HCWs with unprotected exposure, and none showed seroconversion
against H7N9.
conclusions. Despite the delay in airborne precautions implementation, no patient-to-HCW transmission of inﬂuenza A H7N9 was
demonstrated.
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introduction
The emergence of novel inﬂuenza A H7N9 in March 2013 posed
a public health threat locally and internationally.1–3 The patho-
genicity of inﬂuenza A H7N9 appeared to be lower
than that of H5N1, but the former was capable of replicating in
the upper and lower respiratory tract.4 Limited airborne trans-
mission of inﬂuenza A H7N9 has been demonstrated between
ferrets,5 and intrafamilial spread of this virus has been repor-
ted,6–9 hence it is important to intensify the infection control
preparedness and minimize the risk of nosocomial transmission
of inﬂuenza A H7N9. Here, we present our proactive infection
control measures against inﬂuenza A H7N9 in Hong Kong.
methods
Infection Control Preparedness for Inﬂuenza A H7N9
Speciﬁc proactive infection control measures were established in
Queen Mary Hospital, a university-afﬁliated hospital of 1,600
beds, on April 1, 2013, to prevent nosocomial transmission
of inﬂuenza A H7N9. Active and enhanced surveillance was
performed according to the clinical and epidemiologic criteria to
identify suspected cases presented to our hospital (Table 1).
Patients recruited under active surveillance were provided with a
bundle of care, including early segregation in an airborne infec-
tion isolation facility for contact, droplet, and contact precau-
tions; collection of respiratory specimens for a rapid molecular
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diagnostic test; and notiﬁcation to the Department of Health.
With the increasing number of inﬂuenza A H7N9 human
infections reported in mainland China, enhanced surveillance
was implemented as a safety net for infected patients who were
not identiﬁed during active surveillance (Table 1). Enhanced
infection control measures were enforced after conﬁrmation of
the ﬁrst imported case of inﬂuenza A H7N9 in Hong Kong
(Table 2).
Open staff forums held in a lecture room and face-to-face
bedside education sessions were arranged by the infection con-
trol team to provide “right on time” infection control updates to
the frontline healthcare workers (HCWs). Hand hygiene com-
pliance assessments were conducted regularly in our hospital.10
Investigation for Possible Nosocomial Transmission of
Inﬂuenza A H7N9
Upon laboratory conﬁrmation of a human case of inﬂuenza A
H7N9, the infection control team identiﬁed HCWs and patients
with unprotected exposure. Unprotected staff exposure was
deﬁned as contact within 1 meter with a conﬁrmed case and
neither of them wearing surgical masks, in a clinical setting not
involving aerosol-generating procedures. If aerosol-generating
procedures, as deﬁned in Table 2, were performed during con-
tact, unprotected exposure was deﬁned as exposed HCWs not
wearing full personal protective equipment. Unprotected patient
exposure was deﬁned as patients staying in the same cubicle in a
general ward as the index patient, regardless of the duration of
exposure. The list of persons who had visited the index case or
other patients staying in the same cubicle was submitted to
Department of Health for community follow-up.
Contact tracing was performed to identify all potentially
exposed HCWs and patients in our hospital. Oseltamivir
(75 mg twice daily for 5 days) was offered as postexposure
prophylaxis for HCWs and patients with unprotected exposure.
Healthcare workers underwent medical surveillance for
20 days (2 incubation periods of inﬂuenza A H7N9), with daily
monitoring of body temperature and inﬂuenza-like illness by
the infection control team. During medical surveillance, they
were advised to wear a surgical mask in the hospital and
community. Patients with unprotected exposure were quar-
antined for 10 days in the hospital or in the premises provided
by the Department of Health if medical care was no longer
required, followed by medical surveillance for another 10 days.
table 1. Clinical and Epidemiologic Criteria for Active and Enhanced Surveillance of Inﬂuenza A H7N9 in Hong Konga
Active surveillance
A. Clinical criteria
1. Patient with inﬂuenza-like illness (temperature > 38°C with cough or sore throat); or
2. Patient with severe pneumonia; or
3. Patient died of unexplained acute respiratory illness
B. Epidemiologic criteriab
1. Contact with a human case of inﬂuenza A H7N9; or
2. Contact with poultry or wild birds or their remains or with environments contaminated by their feces in countries/areas with
documented avian inﬂuenza A H7N9 infection in birds and/or humans in the previous 6 months; or
3. Consumption of raw or undercooked poultry products in countries/areas with documented avian inﬂuenza A H7N9 infection
in poultry and/or humans in the previous 6 months; or
4. Close contact with a conﬁrmed inﬂuenza A H7N9-infected animal other than poultry or wild birds; or
5. Worked in a laboratory that is processing samples from persons or animals that are suspected from avian inﬂuenza infection.
Enhanced surveillance
A. Clinical criteria
1. Community-acquired pneumonia with unknown causes, which is not responding to antimicrobial treatment for typical and
atypical agents for 3 days; or
2. Community-acquired pneumonia requiring intensive care support
B. Epidemiologic criteria
1. Community-acquired pneumonia occurring in cluster; or
2. Community-acquired pneumonia occurring in healthcare workers; or
3. Community-acquired pneumonia with travel history to mainland China in the past 10 days before symptoms onsetc
aFor active surveillance, patients fulﬁlling any options in both clinical and epidemiologic criteria were tested for inﬂuenza A M gene and H7
speciﬁc HA genes by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction; whereas for enhanced surveillance, patients fulﬁlling either clinical or
epidemiologic criteria were tested for inﬂuenza A M gene and H7 speciﬁc HA genes by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction.
bEpidemiologic criteria include one or more of the following exposures in the 7 days (subsequently increased to 10 days on April 25, 2013) prior
to symptoms onset.
cThis condition was included in the epidemiologic criteria on December 19, 2013, after conﬁrmation of the ﬁrst imported case of human
infection of inﬂuenza A H7N9 in Hong Kong.
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Serologic testing for inﬂuenza A H7N9 was offered to HCWs
with unprotected exposure. Baseline serum and convalescent
serum at day 21 after exposure were collected, on a voluntary
basis, to look for asymptomatic seroconversion. For HCWs
with protected exposure, oseltamivir was not given but they
underwent medical surveillance for 20 days.
Laboratory Diagnosis
Respiratory specimens including nasopharyngeal aspirates,
sputum, endotracheal aspirates, or bronchoalveolar lavage
were collected for direct immunoﬂuorescent antigen test for
inﬂuenza A, and reverse transcription-polymerase chain reac-
tion (RT-PCR) for inﬂuenza AM gene, H1, H3, H5, and H7 as
previously described.11–13 RT-PCR runs were performed
thrice daily at 11:00 AM, 4:00 PM, and midnight. A conﬁrmed
case of inﬂuenza A H7N9 was deﬁned as a patient with positive
RT-PCR results for M gene and H7 speciﬁc HA gene in the
respiratory specimens.
For serologic diagnosis of inﬂuenza A H7N9, serum samples
were treated with receptor-destroying enzyme (1:3) (Denka
Seiken) at 37°C overnight to remove nonspeciﬁc inhibitors,
and residual receptor-destroying enzyme was destroyed
by heat inactivation at 56°C for 30 minutes as recently
described.14 The hemagglutination inhibition test was carried
out in 96-well microtiter plates using reference H7N9 antigen
(A/Anhui/1/2013). Serial 2-fold dilutions of receptor-
destroying enzyme–treated serum from 1:10 were titrated
against 4 hemagglutinin units of reference antigens by incu-
bation at room temperature for 1 hour, followed by adding
0.5% turkey erythrocytes to the serum-virus mixture and
further incubation at room temperature for 30 minutes.
Statistical Analysis
The Fisher exact test was used to compare independent cate-
gorical variables between groups. All reported P values were 2-
sided. A P value of less than 0.05 was considered statistically
signiﬁcant. Computation was performed using SPSS, version
15.0 (IBM).
results
Infection Control Preparedness for Inﬂuenza A H7N9
From April 1, 2013, through May 31, 2014, a total of 163,456
patients were admitted to Queen Mary Hospital, of whom 126
(0.08%) were tested for H7 gene by RT-PCR (Figure 1). There
were 80 males and 46 females. The median age was 57 years
(range, 1–92 years). Twenty-two (17.5%) of the 126 patients
were younger than 15 years. One (0.8%) of the 126 patients
had positive H7 results by RT-PCR. Additionally, another case
of inﬂuenza A H7N9, referred from a regional hospital, was
managed in Queen Mary Hospital.
A total of 10 sessions of open staff forum, with an overall
1,532 hospital staff attendance, were held to update the med-
ical knowledge of infection control concerning inﬂuenza
A H7N9. Video demonstrations of gowning and degowning of
personal protective equipment were provided for all isolation
wards and were also uploaded to the hospital intranet for
review by frontline HCWs. A bedside audit of gowning and
degowning by infection control nurses was performed to
ascertain compliance. Hand hygiene compliance demon-
strated an increase in all clinical departments from 23% (2007
baseline) to 66% (2010) and to 75% (2013).
Investigation for Possible Nosocomial Transmission of
Inﬂuenza A H7N9
Extensive contact tracing of exposed HCWs and patients was
performed according to our infection control protocol. The
ﬁrst case of inﬂuenza A H7N9 was in a 36-year-old Indonesian
woman. The clinical presentation, viral load proﬁle, phyloge-
netic analysis, and treatment of this patient has been described
previously.12,15 She was transferred to the adult intensive care
unit, Queen Mary Hospital, at 6:34 PM November 30, 2013,
with a false-negative result for inﬂuenza A by direct antigen
detection. She was nursed in a single-patient cubicle with no
negative pressure upon arrival and received mechanical venti-
lation, followed by extracorporeal membrane oxygenation,
together with noninvasive ventilator support. Her positive
result for inﬂuenza A H7N9 by RT-PCR test was available from
table 2. Enhanced Infection Control Measures After Conﬁrmation of Imported Case of Inﬂuenza A H7N9 in Hong Konga
Infection control measures in all clinical areas
1. Surgical mask was required for all healthcare workers and visitors in all clinical areas, including waiting areas of outpatient clinics and
emergency departments.
2. Full personal protective equipment, including N95 respirator, eye protection, gloves, and gowns, was required for healthcare workers
performing routine patient care practices in the high-risk areas.b
3. When aerosol-generating proceduresc were performed, patients were transferred into negative pressure airborne infection isolation facilities
and healthcare workers were required to wear full personal protective equipment during the procedures.
aIn addition to the usual practice of hand hygiene and environmental cleanliness, infection control measures in general and high-risk clinical
areas were enhanced after conﬁrmation of the ﬁrst imported case of inﬂuenza A H7N9 in Hong Kong on December 2, 2013.
bHigh-risk areas included triage stations of outpatient clinics and emergency departments, and isolation rooms.
cAerosol-generating procedures included endotracheal intubation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, bronchoscopy, and open suction of respiratory
tract, sputum induction, use of nebulizer therapy, noninvasive positive pressure ventilation, and high-frequency oscillatory ventilation.
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the referral hospital after 48 hours of stay in our adult intensive
care unit. The patient was immediately transferred to the
airborne infection isolation room. Three debrieﬁng sessions
were held to explain the logistics of postexposure antiviral
prophylaxis, collection of paired sera for H7 antibody test, and
medical surveillance to the 70 HCWs with unprotected expo-
sure, because none of them had worn an N95 respirator during
patient care activities with aerosol-generating procedures.
Forty-eight HCWs had baseline blood collected; however,
only 33 (47.1%) of the 70 HCWs had paired sera available
for H7 antibody analysis. Nonetheless, 15 of the 16 HCWs
with unprotected exposure involving high-risk patient contact
were tested and showed no seroconversion. The demographic
characteristics of the 70 HCWs under medical surveillance, with
respect to high-risk and non–high-risk patient contacts, are
illustrated in Table 3.
The second patient was a 65-year-old man with chronic
renal failure who had traveled to Shenzhen, mainland China,
on January 1, 2014. He presented with fever and cough 3 days
later and was admitted to our general medical ward via the
emergency department with community-acquired pneumonia
4 days after onset of symptoms. Although this patient had no
history of poultry contact, he was screened for inﬂuenza A
H7N9 in the enhanced surveillance scheme (Table 1). The
patient was immediately transferred to the airborne infection
isolation room when the positive inﬂuenza A H7N9 RT-PCR
result became available after 30 hours of hospitalization.
No aerosol-generating procedure was performed in the
general ward. Contact tracing revealed 4 patients with unpro-
tected exposure. Nasopharyngeal aspirates were collected to
exclude asymptomatic infection of inﬂuenza A H7N9, and the
4 patients were quarantined for 10 days, followed by another
10 days of medical surveillance. A total of 51 HCWs had
contact with this patient or had attended the implicated
cubicles at the emergency department or the general medical
ward. They were considered to have protected exposure
because they had worn surgical masks in the clinical areas,
hence oseltamivir was not offered. During medical surveil-
lance, 6 HCWs (11.8%) developed inﬂuenza-like illness. They
all had negative test results for H7 HA gene PCR.
discussion
When the ﬁrst case of inﬂuenza A H7N9 was reported to the
World Health Organization on March 31, 2014, proactive
infection control measures with a bundle approach for early
recognition of the index case, isolation in an airborne infection
isolation room, and extensive contact tracing for HCWs
and patients with unprotected exposure was immediately insti-
tuted in our hospital. Frontline HCWs in the triage station of the
emergency department were responsible for identifying patients
fulﬁlling the clinical and epidemiologic criteria of inﬂuenza
A H7N9 among emergency admissions, whereas medical
and nursing staff in the admission wards were responsible
ﬁgure 1. Surveillance of Inﬂuenza A H7N9 in Queen Mary Hospital from April 1, 2013, through May 31, 2014.
Fifty-six (44.4%) of 126 patients fulﬁlled the clinical and epidemiologic criteria of active surveillance and were admitted directly to the
airborne infection isolation rooms in internal medicine (32 patients), pediatrics (18), and adult intensive care units (6). Nasopharyngeal
aspirates were the most commonly collected respiratory specimens in 54 patients, whereas endotracheal aspirates and bronchoalveolar lavage
were collected in 1 patient each. None of these 56 patients had positive results for the H7 gene by reverse transcription-polymerase chain
reaction. Seventy (55.6%) of 126 patients were tested according to the criteria of enhanced surveillance, of which 37 patients were referred
from adult intensive care unit, 26 patients from medical specialty, 3 from pediatrics, 3 from surgery, and 1 from orthopedic surgery.
Nasopharyngeal aspirates were collected in 56 patients whereas lower respiratory specimens, including endotracheal aspirates and
bronchoalveolar lavage, were collected in the remaining 14 patients. The median interval from admission to respiratory specimen collection
was 1 day (range, 0 [on the day of admission] to 38 days).
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for collecting this information among elective admitted patients
as part of the active surveillance program. None of the
56 patients recruited in the active surveillance program had
positive results for inﬂuenza A H7N9. In contrast, 1 of 70
patients tested for H7 gene under enhanced surveillance was
conﬁrmed to have inﬂuenza A H7N9. Enhanced surveillance
appeared to be an important safety net in the detection of
inﬂuenza A H7N9 infection because only 55% and 67% of the
conﬁrmed patients had a history of poultry contact or had
visited a live poultry market, respectively, as illustrated in the
recent case control study on risk factors in patients with H7N9
disease.16
Despite the implementation of active and enhanced sur-
veillance, diagnosis in one of the conﬁrmed cases was delayed
owing to a high false-negative rate of the direct antigen test
compared with RT-PCR.17 Delay in the diagnosis of inﬂuenza
A H7N9 infection resulted in unprotected exposure of 70
HCWs. Since most of them complied with standard and dro-
plet precautions by wearing a surgical mask and performing
hand hygiene after high-risk patient contacts, none of the
tested paired sera showed H7N9 antibody seroconversion. We
suspect that the high hand hygiene compliance in our hospital,
as a result of continuous implementation of proactive control
measures against various viruses and multidrug-resistant
organisms,11,18–22 has protected our frontline HCWs against
many challenges of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases.
Additionally, our ﬁndings suggested that use of standard and
droplet precautions appeared to be effective in the prevention
of nosocomial transmission of inﬂuenza A H7N9, even during
the initial phase of infection where the viral load was highest.15
Our ﬁndings also concurred with the recent observation of a lack
of subclinical infections among 126 HCWs bymeans of serologic
investigation in Zhejiang Province, China.23 Although the risk
of human-to-human transmission of inﬂuenza A H7N9 virus
appeared to be low, Chinese national guidelines recommend a
combination of standard, contact, and droplet precautions by
HCWs in the hospitals.9 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention in the United States recommends a higher level of
infection control precautions with addition of airborne precau-
tions, in view of the lack of a widely available, safe, and effective
vaccine as well as a high rate of morbidity and mortality among
H7N9-infected patients.24 In Hong Kong, we adopted the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendation.
To circumvent the problemwith limited isolation facilities in our
locality, our laboratory conducts regular RT-PCR testing for all
suspected cases every 8 hours, which facilitates early discharge of
suspected patients from airborne infection isolation rooms when
test results are negative.
There are several limitations to this study. First, only 33
(47.1%) of the 70 HCWs with unprotected exposure had
paired sera examination for H7N9 seroconversion. Subclinical
infection may be underestimated. However, since almost all
HCWs with unprotected exposure during high-risk patient
contacts did not show seroconversion, it is unlikely that
nosocomial transmission of inﬂuenza went unrecognized.
Second, there is no evidence of efﬁcient human-to-human
transmission of inﬂuenza A H7N9 in the community at this
stage. The lack of nosocomial transmission of inﬂuenza A
H7N9 in our healthcare setting may represent the intrinsic
characteristic of the virus instead of the result of our infection
table 3. Demographic Characteristics of 70 Healthcare Workers Under Medical Surveillance After Unprotected Exposure to a Conﬁrmed
Case of Inﬂuenza A H7N9 for 48 Hours
High-risk patient contactsa
(n= 16)
Non–high-risk patient contactsb
(n= 54) P value
Staff rank 0.001
Medical staff 0 13 (24%)
Nursing staff 14 (88%) 27 (50%)
Allied health staff 2 (13%) 0
Supporting staff 0 14 (26%)
Male sex 7 (44%) 24 (44%) 0.961
In-charge staff 6 (38%) 2 (4%) <0.001
Wearing of surgical mask 13 (81%) 28 (52%) 0.036
Wearing of gloves 2 (13%) 8 (15%) 0.816
Wearing of gowns 2 (13%) 5 (9%) 0.704
Hand hygiene after patient contact 16 (100%) 42 (78%) 0.038
Received oseltamivir postexposure prophylaxis 11 (69%) 24 (44%) 0.088
Development of ILI during medical surveillance 4 (25%) 6 (11%) 0.163
Completion of paired sera testing for antibody against H7 15 (94%) 18 (33%) <0.001
Seroconversion of antibody against H7 0 0 NA
NOTE. ILI, inﬂuenza-like illness; NA, not applicable.
aHigh-risk patient contacts include disconnection of ventilator circuit for end tidal carbon dioxide monitoring in 6 staff, caring for noninvasive
ventilation in 5, extubation in 3, and performing chest physiotherapy in 2.
bNon–high-risk patient contacts include adjustment and monitoring of medical equipment in 29 staff, patient turning and bathing in 13,
physical examination in 10, and room cleansing in 2.
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control intervention. However, compared with the higher rate
of H5 antibody seroconversion among HCWs in Hong Kong
during the outbreak of inﬂuenza A H5N1 in 1997,25 our
healthcare system appears to be better prepared for challenges
posed by known or unknown emerging pathogens.
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